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Spatial asymmetric duopoly with an application to 
Brussels’ airports 
Fay Dunkerley1, Andre de Palma2 and Stef Proost3 
December 2008 
Abstract 
In this paper the problem of a city with access to two firms or facilities (shopping 
malls, airports, commercial districts) selling a differentiated product (shopping, 
flights) and/or offering a differentiated workplace is studied. Transport connections 
to one facility are congested. A model is presented for this asymmetric duopoly 
game that can be solved for a Nash equilibrium in prices and wages. A comparative 
statics analysis is used to illustrate the properties of the equilibrium. A numerical 
model is then applied to the two Brussels airports. Three stylised policies are 
implemented to address the congestion problem: expansion of transport capacity; 
congestion pricing; and a direct subsidy to the uncongested facility.  
Our results indicate that the degree of intrinsic differentiation between the two firms 
is crucial in determining the difference in profit and market share. Price and wage 
differences also depend on trip frequency and consumer preferences for diversity. 
Congestion pricing is the most effective policy tool but all three options are shown 
to have attractive attributes.  
Keywords:  duopoly, imperfect competition, congestion, general equilibrium, airport competition 
JEL-classification:  L13, D43, R41, R13 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we study the problem of a city that has access to two competing firms or 
facilities (e.g. shopping centres, airports, commercial districts) selling a differentiated 
product. Facilities are modelled as firms. The first facility has low transport costs but is 
easily congested (near city centre, access by road). The second one has higher transport 
costs but is less prone to congested access (ample public transport capacity, parking 
etc.). Both facilities need to attract customers and employees by offering prices and 
wages that are sufficiently attractive to cover their fixed costs. The equilibrium is the 
outcome of the interplay between endogenous congestion and market forces. In the 
absence of any government regulation, there will be an asymmetric duopoly game that 
can be solved for a Nash equilibrium in prices and wages offered by each of the two 
facilities. This solution is typically characterised by excessive congestion for the nearby 
facility. We first analyse in detail the comparative statics for the duopoly set-up and 
then study the welfare effects of a number of stylised policies.  
The first policy is to widen the road to the nearby facility 1. Interestingly, this policy 
will not necessarily lead to less congestion as more customers will be attracted by the 
lower transport costs. This is close to the well known Braess paradox in transport 
economics (Braess 1969). In our paper we add product and labour differentiation and it 
will be the degrees of differentiation that will determine how successful the road 
extension strategy is. The second policy is to add congestion pricing (or parking pricing 
etc.) for the congested facility. This will decrease its profit margin and attract more 
customers. The third policy is more acceptable for politicians: providing a direct 
subsidy to the remote facility, reducing its marginal costs and reducing its price. This 
policy will again ease the congestion problem for the nearby facility but will do this in a 
very costly way.  
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We apply our model to airports, using Brussels International Airport (Zaventem) and 
Charleroi -Brussels South (Charleroi) to illustrate the effect of the above policy options. 
Increasingly cities in Europe are served by two (or more) airports, which offer 
differentiated products in terms of quality and frequency of flights but also differ in 
their amenities and accessibility.  
Our results show that, for the duopoly set-up, the difference in benefits accruing to 
residents who shop (take flights at an airport) or work at the two facilities is crucial in 
determining the difference in profits and market share. This is true both with and 
without congestion. When there is congestion, the difference in profits between the two 
firms increases if the road capacity of the intrinsically better firm increases. However, 
changes in the price and wage differences depend on trip frequency and consumer 
preferences for diversity. These results are borne out in our numerical airport 
application. Further, all three policies are shown to have attractive attributes. 
Compared to the literature our model is one of the first to offer an integrated model of 
monopolistic competition between facilities where both shopping and commuting costs 
are integrated and that can be operationalised for the non symmetrical case. In fact our 
model works for any facility where users have to cover a certain distance from a 
common origin. In its application one can focus on differentiated products, 
differentiated workplaces or a combination of both. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature. The 
general theoretical framework of the model is described in Section 3 and the duopoly 
model is then considered in more detail in Section 4. The existing market equilibrium 
for the airport application is developed in Section 5 and the effects of our policy options 
are discussed. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE 
A number of authors have addressed the issue of congestion in an oligopolistic setting. 
Scotchmer (1985) looks at price competition between congestible facilities in a 
symmetric setting when total demand is fixed. de Palma and Leruth (1989) present a 
two-stage duopoly game, in which the firms first choose capacities and then set prices 
for goods that are perfect substitutes. They consider both homogeneous consumers and 
consumers who differ in their willingness to pay to avoid congestion. Price competition 
between two firms offering perfect substitutes is also analysed by Van Dender (2005): 
in this case firms have congested access (for example to a port or airport) and there is 
additional non-duopoly traffic. de Palma and Proost (2006) consider price and wage 
competition between a number of firms supplying a differentiated product when the 
transport infrastructure may be congested. A bottleneck model is used and tolling 
examined. They only offer results for the symmetric case where all firms are identical 
and have the same transport infrastructure. This paper is therefore a generalisation of the 
de Palma and Proost (2006) paper to the asymmetric case as well as a first numerical 
implementation of this class of monopolistic competition and congestion models.  This 
paper adds asymmetries in firms’ costs, infrastructure capacity and consumer 
preferences but is restricted to a duopoly in order to keep analytical results tractable.  
Another strand of the literature on spatial oligopoly with imperfect competition looks at 
location choice for firms and consumers. Fujita and Thisse (2002) provides an 
overview. Lambertini (1997), for example, investigates the use of tax or subsidies to 
directly affect firms’ location in a horizontally differentiated duopoly without explicitly 
modifying their price behaviour. In our study, however, we consider the effect of policy 
on pricing behaviour of the existing duopoly firms at fixed locations. 
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The literature on airport and airline competition, although not the focus of this paper, is 
also of interest for our model application. None of these studies consider the product 
and labour markets simultaneously. Ivaldi and Vibes (2004) model oligopolistic price 
competition between traditional and low cost airlines and rail competing on the same 
route using a game theoretic approach and consider the effect of a kerosene tax. There is 
no congestion in their model. There are several econometric studies of airport choice 
which make use of data for three airports in the San Francisco Bay Area. Hess and 
Polak (2005) show that access time, fare and frequency of service have a significant 
influence on airport choice but this differed between types of travellers. Pels et al. 
(2003) look at access mode and airport choice for residents only and find access time to 
be the dominant explanatory factor. Basar and Bhat (2004) allow for the fact that 
travellers may not consider all available airports when choosing their departure airport 
but they also find access time to be important. The impact of low cost carriers on the 
industry has also been widely studied (see, for example, Barrett 2004 and Franke 2004). 
Pels and Rietveld (2004) also analyse price responses between low cost and traditional 
carriers using fare data for the Paris-London route. Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) use 
a conjectural variational approach to show that, for airlines in the US, entry of a low-
cost carrier on a route reduces mark-up but not to a competitive level.  Applying 
congestion tolling to cope with flight congestion at airports has also been studied 
(Brueckner 2002, Pels and Verhoef, 2004). Here we are concerned only with congested 
access to airports. 
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3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Model Setting 
The model starts with the de Palma and Proost (2006) model, in which a simple general 
equilibrium framework is developed to study imperfect competition in a city both with 
and without congestion. They concentrate their analysis on the symmetric situation, 
while we extend the basic model set-up to the more general asymmetric case. Moreover, 
for our airport application, we are interested in the theoretical effect of congestion and 
the degree of product differentiation on price and wage setting in a duopoly. We 
therefore limit ourselves to a brief description of the general model here1 A more 
detailed theoretical analysis of the properties in the duopoly case is presented in Section 
4.  
Residents live in a city centre and travel to facilities (airports in our numerical example) 
to work and shop (take a flight in our application). Shopping and working decisions are 
made independently, so that trip chaining is excluded, and residents can only travel 
between the centre and each facility and not between facilities (see Figure 1). A 
homogeneous good is produced in the city centre and used as an intermediate input for 
the differentiated good, which is produced in the facilities. Thus, both firms (transport 
of inputs) and consumers (shopping and commuting) incur travel costs. At each facility, 
there is a single firm that offers one differentiated product variant and one differentiated 
job variant. The homogenous good is used for different purposes: as intermediate input 
for the differentiated good, to produce the fixed installations to produce the 
differentiated good, to pay for transport costs, to construct roads. The remainder serves 
as homogenous consumption good. The government can levy a lump sum tax (or 
                                                     
1 The reader is referred to de Palma and Proost (2006) for a full description of the general equilibrium model. 
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subsidy) S per firm and T per household as well as congestion taxes on all transport but 
has to pay for road infrastructure extensions.  
This model set up can obviously also be used to study the relation between transport 
costs and monopolistic competition on only the product market or on only the labour 
market instead of both simultaneously. It is sufficient to assume that the goods produced 
in or the labour supplied to the facility are homogeneous. 
Figure 1 Schematic of city layout 
The Economy 
The model is a general equilibrium model as we have differentiated product and 
labour markets which interact with the rest of the economy represented by the 
homogeneous good. We have only one production factor: labour. The identity for 
labour supply and demand in the economy as a whole is always satisfied. 
1 1 1 1
(1 ) ( )
N n N n
w d h
i i i i i i
i i i i
N D c D F t D K Gθ α α α
= = = =
+ = + + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   
 In this equation, the left hand side represents total labour supply and the right hand 
side, the demand for labour. Each household supplies one unit of labour for the 
production of the differentiated good and θ units of labour for the production of the 
homogeneous good. The first term on the right hand side represents the direct use of 
labour in the differentiated goods industry. The second and third terms represent the use 
of the homogeneous good as variable and fixed intermediate input for the differentiated 
goods. The fourth term is the total transportation cost (including commuting, shopping 
and intermediate deliveries). The fifth term represents public capital input for each 
differentiated product, with the last term (G) being residual consumption.  
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We make three important assumptions to simplify the representation of the economy: 
the input of one unit of homogeneous labour produces one unit of the homogeneous 
good; each household consumes one unit of the differentiated good and supplies one 
unit of labour for its production; and the production function for the differentiated goods 
industry is linear. The main implications are that we can concentrate on a partial 
equilibrium model for the differentiated goods industry as prices of other goods are 
fixed, and that we can normalise the price of the homogeneous good and the wage of 
homogeneous labour as well as the value of time to one. The homogenous good will 
serve as the numeraire. 
Congestion 
The main effect of congestion on the model is to make travel times endogenous. Instead 
of being constant, travel times increase with the number of road users, where the road 
users are customers, commuters and trucks delivering the intermediate input. In line 
with de Palma and Proost 2006, we assume that roads have a fixed capacity and that a 
bottleneck develops if the activity on a road exceeds its capacity. In the bottleneck 
model road users choose their trip timing. In the simplest case, where all agents have the 
same desired arrival times and the same valuation of time, we can define the 
endogenous travel time for the asymmetric model as 
(1) 1o wi i it t NP sαδ −= +   
where d w hα α α κα= + + , is the weighted sum of shopping, commuting and truck 
delivery frequencies, and κ  ensures that one truck trip has the same congestion effect as 
κ  shopping or commuting trips. wiNP represents the supply of labour from N 
households to facility i. As we need one unit of labour per unit of product, multiplying 
the total labour supply to a facility by α gives us the total transport volume in the RHS 
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of equation (1). In the absence of congestion oit  is the transport time from the centre to 
facility i and is is the corresponding road capacity. From (1) it can be seen that roads are 
free of congestion in the limit of infinite bottleneck capacity. The coefficient 
δ translates waiting time and schedule delays into equivalent costs according to the 
bottleneck model. 
Household Preferences 
Household2 utility is represented by a linear function of the utility obtained from 
consumption of the differentiated and homogeneous goods and the disutility of 
supplying labour to the production of these goods. . Each household is paid a wage, iw , 
for working at facility i and buys one unit of variant k at price, kp . Both prices and 
wages at the n facilities will be determined by the model. Thus, the consumer’s 
commuting and shopping travel costs are given by w itα  and d itα respectively, where, 
from (1), it is endogenous. Using the household budget equation to substitute for 
consumption of the homogeneous good, an indirect conditional utility function can be 
derived to express household preferences. In this case the utility function represents the 
preferences of a household that buys differentiated good k and supplies labour to facility 
i: 
(2) 
1
1(1 ) , , 1...
n
d w
ik k k k i i i l
l
U h p t w t T i k n
N
α β α θ β π
=
= − − + − − + − + − =∑? ? .  
                                                     
2 In the following we will use household and consumer interchangeably as it is easier to consider the 
household as a single worker or customer. 
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The utility of consumption of differentiated product variant k is given by an intrinsic 
quality component kh and a stochastic component
d
kμ ε  such that dk k kh h μ ε= +?   and 
the disutility of labour at facility i is similarly given by wi i iβ β μ ε= −? . 
Hence, all households will value the quality of the product variant manufactured at a 
particular facility in the same way and will experience the same disinclination to work 
at a given facility; in both cases possibly assigning different values to different 
facilities. However, the households will still vary in their tastes: iε and kε are random 
variables which represent the intrinsic heterogeneity of household tastes and it is 
assumed that they are independently, identically distributed according to the double 
exponential distribution. The (non-negative) parameters wμ and dμ determine the degree 
of heterogeneity of preferences. 
So in (2), the three first terms give the net utility of buying at facility k, the next three 
terms give the net disutility of supplying differentiated labour at facility i. The 
remaining three terms represent a household’s utility from consuming the homogeneous 
good, paid for by his supply of homogenous labour θ (that gives him a disutility β per 
unit of labour supplied) and his share of the total profits minus the head-tax (T). We 
assume all consumers have the same share in the profits of both facilities so that the last 
three terms of (2) are identical for all households.  
When a household chooses where to work, this decision is independent of its shopping 
decision and vice versa since we rule out trip chaining. The probability that a consumer 
chooses to commute to facility i of the n possible facilities is then 
| |Pr { 1,..., }i
w
i k j kP ob U U j n= ≥ ∀ = , where | w wi k k i i i iU w tβ α μ ε= Ω + − − +  and 
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1(1 ) d dk l k k k k
l
T h p t
N
θ β π α μ εΩ = − + − + − − +∑  is assumed fixed for the choice of 
employment location. wiP can be written as a logit type probability  
(3) 
1
exp exp , 1...
ww
j j jw i i i
i w w
j
w tw tP i n
β αβ α
μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞− −= =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ ,  
which is independent of k. For the household choice of shopping location, a similar 
expression for the probability is derived: 
(4) 
1
exp exp , 1...
dd
j j jd k k k
k d d
j
h p th p tP k n
αα
μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞− −= =⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∑ .  
Since travel times are endogenous, the trip time equation (1), the demand for 
commuting (3) and for shopping (4) are implicit equations in ,i kt , 
w
iP  and
d
kP : for every 
facility, the trip cost depends on total demand. Even for the duopoly case, these 
equations cannot be solved analytically, since kt is endogenous, and a numerical 
solution of the market demand equations is required for each value of p and w.  
Using the assumptions of inelastic demand for the differentiated good and fixed labour 
input for the differentiated good, a market clearing condition also applies at each 
facility: 
(5) w di iP P= .  
Each firm can a priori decide upon purchase price and wage. However, the product and 
labour market for each facility variant have to clear and this clearing is linked: every 
unit sold needs one unit of differentiated labour supplied. This implies that the firm can 
not choose its price and wage independently. A price increase implies smaller sales so a 
smaller need for labour and therefore a smaller wage needs to be offered by this facility 
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to clear the labour market for its job variant. So (5) defines implicitly the relation 
between price level and wage level for each facility.3  
Profits of firms 
There are n firms, each located at one of the facilities. The profit of firm i is 
(6) ( , ) ( ) ( )hi i i i i i iw p p w c t D F Sπ α= − − − − + ,  
where hi ic tα+ is the marginal cost of the intermediate input, iF is the fixed production 
cost and iS is the government levy to pay for public infrastructure. The inelastic demand 
condition gives us 
1
n
i
i
D N
=
=∑ and from (5), we obtain demand w di i iD NP NP= = . 
 Each firm selects prices and wages to maximise his profits, taking the prices and wages 
of his competitors as given. Thus we look for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in 
these variables. 
Equilibrium 
The strategic variables of firm i are iw and ip . From the market clearing condition (5), 
substituting from (3) and (4), it is clear that the choice of iw  determines the choice of 
ip (and vice versa), since all other prices and wages are taken as given. Any price ip  
determines the demand, i.e. the quantity to be produced. This quantity corresponds to a 
number of workers that can be “attracted” by an appropriate value of the wage iw . The 
trade-off is measured by the expression i idp dw (<0), which specifies how a decrease in 
price is related to an increase in wage (since fewer workers are required). Thus, we can 
rewrite the profit equation (6) as 
                                                     
3 Note that this is true even when demand is elastic or when one needs more or less than one unit of differentiated 
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 [ ] [ ]( ) [ ] ( )h wi i i i i i i i i i iw p w w c t NP w F Sπ α= − − − − + .  
Thus, taking iw as our only strategic variable, the best response of firm i is given by 
(7) 1 2 0
w
w h o h wi i i
i i i i i i i
i i i
d dp dPNP p w c t P N
dw dw dw
π α⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + − − − − Λ =⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ,  
where 
(1 )
[ (1 )]
w w w
i i i
w w w w
i i i i
dP P P
dw P Pμ
−= +Λ − , 
[ (1 )] 0
[ (1 )]
d d d d
i i i i
w w w w
i i i i
dp P P
dw P P
μ
μ
+Λ −= − <+Λ −  and 
h
h
i
i
N
s
αα δΛ = . 
Simplifying (7) and using the market clearing condition (5) leads to 
 
2ˆ(1 ) ( ) ( ) 0
[ (1 )] 1
w w d w
h o h w wi i
i i i i i i iw w w w w
i i i i i
NP P Np w c t P P
P P P s
μ μ δ ααμ
⎡ ⎤− + − − − − + Λ + =⎢ ⎥+ Λ − −⎣ ⎦
  
and hence the candidate Nash equilibrium in prices and wages is given by 
(8) 
2ˆ( )
1
d w
h o h w w
i i i i i i iw
i i
Np w c t P P
P s
μ μ δ αα+= + + + +Λ +−
4.  
This wage-price equilibrium cannot be solved analytically, except for the symmetric 
solution. Note that the model cannot determine the absolute values of ip  and iw . The 
main reason is that the aggregate demand for the differentiated good and the aggregate 
supply of differentiated labour are fixed. Therefore, increasing the absolute level of all 
ip  and iw  would not affect aggregate demand and supply of differentiated goods and 
labour as there is no arbitrage with the homogeneous goods. All one needs is to 
                                                                                                                                                           
labour to produce one unit of the differentiated good.  
4 We computed the asymmetric equilibrium assuming that every consumer can purchase the differentiated good he 
prefers. This can always be made possible by assuming that the productivity is large enough or the combined 
production, transportation and public expenditure costs are sufficiently low. 
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guarantee feasibility. Of course one expects that the absolute level of the ip  and iw  will 
affect the profit iπ  and utility. But profits (eqn (8)) are a function of i ip w−  because 
one unit of the differentiated good requires one unit of differentiated labour. This also 
holds for household utility (eqn (2)). This implies that one can freely choose the level of 
one of the differentiated wages (or prices). Increasing this wage by an arbitrary fixed 
amount will imply that the corresponding price will also increase by the same arbitrary 
amount and that, via the market share equalities, all other wages and prices will follow5.  
Congestion is present in the last two terms in (8). These are the queuing costs and 
schedule delay costs, since the traffic is not able to travel at the free-flow speed ( oit ). As 
this is a bottleneck representation of congestion, we know that with perfect congestion 
pricing one can halve these costs by eliminating the queuing costs but the schedule 
delay costs remain. Congestion affects the delivery of intermediate goods, shopping and 
commuting costs to a facility. Secondly, congestion makes the effective demand 
(supply) function for the facilities’ products (jobs) steeper (see 
w
i
i
dP
dw
in (7) where the 
denominator is a positive function of congestion factor Λ).  Let us first develop the 
intuition for this in the absence of labour market interaction. The intuition is then that 
any price decrease will initially attract more customers. But, these customers will 
themselves increase travel time so that, in the end, the net increase in the number of 
customers is somewhat lower than in the absence of congestion. So, for a firm, it pays 
less to decrease its prices. This effect is reinforced when we include the labour supply 
effect. If firms reduce prices and increase market share, they will also need to attract 
more workers but the commuting workers will add to congestion reducing the number 
                                                     
5 This indeterminacy breaks down when the aggregate demand for the differentiated good is no longer 
fixed. Then the level of the differentiated good price matters relative to the price of the homogeneous 
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of customers and necessitating higher wage increases. So shopping and commuting 
congestion help to preserve market power.  
Welfare Analysis 
In addition to effects on price, profit and market share, we are interested in the welfare 
implications of the asymmetric model. Welfare per household can be derived from 
[ ]max ikW E U= , since profits are equally distributed among households. Starting from 
the definition of utility (2) and taking account of the independence of the labour and 
consumption decisions we can write 
 max maxw w d di i i i i k k k k kW E w t E h p tβ α μ ε α μ ε⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= Ψ + − − + + − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ,  
where 1(1 )
n
l N Tθ β πΨ = − + −∑ . Where T closes the government budget and takes 
into account subsidies or taxes on firms as well as revenues from congestion taxes. 
Given that the error terms are double exponentially distributed, after some further 
manipulation (see for example Anderson et al. 1992), the welfare can be expressed as 
 
( )
ln exp ln exp
w d
j j j j j jw d
w d
j j
w t h p t
W
β α αμ μμ μ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − −= Ψ + +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ,  
which can be further simplified using the market clearing condition.  
This measure of welfare in the short-run uses the equilibrium prices, wages and travel 
costs calculated by the model, which enter the welfare formulation via the exponential 
terms and the profit. When we add fully time differentiated congestion pricing in this 
bottleneck model, half of the sum of schedule delay and queuing costs are converted 
into toll revenue that increases W via a lower lump sum tax T in Ψ. This toll revenue 
                                                                                                                                                           
good. 
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corresponds to the direct welfare gain (in terms of saved transport costs) of tolling. 
There can be indirect welfare gains or losses via changes in profit margins that can 
change, in the long term, the number of facilities. Indeed, congestion may lead to over-
entry in the longer term, since firms are able to make larger profits in the absence of 
road pricing (see de Palma and Proost 2006). 
4. DUOPOLY MODEL  
When there are only two firms competing in the market and these differ in their intrinsic 
characteristics or in the level of congestion on their transport links, it is instructive from 
a policy perspective to examine how changes in these parameters influence the 
behaviour of the firms. For this purpose, we undertake a comparative statics exercise.  
To begin our analysis of the duopoly case we first introduce some notation: the 
differences in the exogenous firm characteristics are represented by 2 1h h hΔ = − , 
2 1β β βΔ = − , 2 1c c cΔ = −  and 12o o ot t tΔ = − ; and the differences in the variables by 
2 1p p pΔ = −  and 2 1w w wΔ = − . We further define 2 2 1 1m m mP P s P s= −Δ  for ,m d w= . 
Equations (3), (4) and (8), can then be simplified. The expression (3) for wiP reduces to 
(9) 
1
1 1 exp
w
w
w
XP μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,  
where w w o w wX w t N Pβ α α αδ≡ Δ −Δ − Δ − Δ , with the last term explicitly representing 
the endogenous congestion part. Clearly 2 11
w wP P= − .Moreover, we have from (4) 
(10) 
1
1 1 exp
d
d
d
XP μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,  
Spatial Asymmetric Duopoly with an application to Brussels’ airports   17
where d d o d dX p h t N Pα α αδ≡ −Δ + Δ − Δ − Δ . Note that wX and dX  represent 
respectively the difference in utility experienced by a consumer who chooses to work or 
shop at the two firms. 
We know from market clearing that 1 1
w dP P= . Equations (9) and (10) thus imply that 
there is an equality between net price and net wage difference, weighted by the degree 
of heterogeneity in consumer preferences 
(11) / /w w d dX Xμ μ= .  
The Nash equilibrium first order condition (8) in prices and wages can then be 
reformulated as 
(12) ( ) 0 2ˆ2 sinh dd w h h d ddXp w c t N P N Pμ μ α αα δ α δμ⎛ ⎞Δ = + + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
Further, substituting from (11) in the definition of wX , we obtain 
(13) 0
w
d w w w
dw X t N P
μ β α α αδμΔ = + Δ + Δ + Δ  
Combining (12) and (13), and given that market clearing also implies w dP PΔ = Δ , leads 
to an implicit equation for the price difference between the two firms in the Nash 
equilibrium 
(14) 
2ˆ22sinh
d d
d
d d d w d w
X X N BPα δμ μ μ μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − Δ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, 
where we use the following definition: 
DEFINITION: The facility rank 0ˆB h c tβ α⎡ ⎤≡ Δ −Δ −Δ − Δ⎣ ⎦  and ˆ d w hα α α α≡ + + . 
 A corresponding expression can be obtained for wX . The facility rank B is constant 
and depends only on the exogenous parameters. It represents the difference in benefits 
accruing to residents who shop or work at the two facilities and can be seen as a rank 
Spatial Asymmetric Duopoly with an application to Brussels’ airports   18
parameter to determine the optimal order for long term entry (from a welfare point of 
view) when there is no congestion.  
Using (6), we can also express the difference in profit between the two firms in the 
Nash equilibrium as 
(15) 
( ) ( )2 22 12 2
2 1
ˆ2 ( )sinh ( )
d dd
d w
d
P PXN N F S
s s
π μ μ δ αμ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥Δ = + + − −Δ +⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 
where 2 1π π πΔ = −  and ( )F SΔ +  represents the difference in their fixed costs. 
In general the transport time component of wX and dX  is endogenous and varies with 
congestion (see (1)). This is the case we are most interested in for real world modelling 
applications. However, the solution is less tractable as price and wage differences are 
related in a non-linear way. In the following analysis we therefore first consider the 
model without congestion in order to gain some useful insights. These comparative 
statics results also apply, however, when the transport links are congested and this is 
explored in a separate section.   
Comparative Statics in the absence of congestion  
When there is no congestion ( 0dPΔ = ) the facility rank B is a crucial parameter in 
determining the effect of differences in the characteristics of the two competing firms. It 
is zero when the firms are identical or when the combination of quality and cost 
parameters of the two firms is such that they are ranked in the same way. When the 
gross benefits accruing to residents that work or shop at facility 2 are greater than those 
accruing to residents who patronise facility 1, B is positive6.  
                                                     
6 Without loss of generality, in all the following analysis, we can assume B is non-negative since the order of firms 
can always be reversed. It also follows that both Xd and Xw are non-negative. This is proved in the appendix. 
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Proposition 1 If firm 2 can be considered to be intrinsically better than firm 1, i.e. the 
facility rank B is positive, then firm 2 will have an advantage in profit and market share 
and this advantage will be larger when its intrinsic superiority is greater. 
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
This result generalises the property developed by Anderson and de Palma in a setting 
with no spatial dimension and only the products market. We add labour market 
differentiation and transport costs. The intuition is that, in this Nash equilibrium, in 
order to maximise profits, the firm with an absolute advantage has an interest in 
absorbing part of this absolute advantage, by limiting its price increase, for the purpose 
of increasing market share and ultimately profits. The intuition for pΔ  being an 
increasing function of the difference in disutility of labour βΔ  is less obvious: an 
increase in the disutility of labour (increase in 2β ) requires an increase in 2w  to attract 
sufficient labour and a reduction in sales achieved by increasing 2p . Hence the wage 
difference also increases with both product quality differences hΔ  and disutility 
difference βΔ  as firm 2 strives to attract labour. 
In order to see the role of transport cost differences, start with 0B =  so that both 
facilities have the same intrinsic benefits, then a small decrease in the access time for 
facility 2 ( decrease in otΔ ) means 0B >  and this leads, ceteris paribus, to an increase 
in pΔ  and a decrease in wΔ , where the size of the increase is determined by the 
shopping and commuting frequency αˆ . 
Prices, wages and profits also depend on the degree of consumer heterogeneity with 
respect to working and shopping preferences, represented by parameters wμ and dμ .  
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Proposition 2 If firm 2 is intrinsically better than firm 1 ( 0B > ) then the difference in 
profit and market share between the two firms decreases when there is greater 
consumer preference for diversity either in consumption of the differentiated good or in 
supply of labour to the differentiated good. 
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Differences in profit and market share are in fact symmetric functions of dμ  and wμ . In 
general stronger consumer preferences for diversity mean that firm 2 cannot make the 
most of its intrinsic advantage and its profits and sales consequently suffer. Stronger 
preferences for diversity in shopping location tend to reduce the price difference 
between the two firms. Firm 2 cannot rely on being intrinsically better to attract 
customers and has to reduce its mark-up over firm 1.  
A summary of the main comparative statics results is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Comparative statics without congestion  
Comparative statics with congestion 
When congestion is added to the model, congestion related terms appear in the price, 
wage and profit difference equations. Further, the time components of wX and dX  are 
no longer exogenous and explicitly include congestion effects. These congestion terms 
depend on trip frequency and road capacity. The impact of congestion will be small if 
trip frequency is low or if there is little congestion (ample road capacity is ) so that the 
congestion part ( 1 wi iNs Pδ α− ) of (1) is small ( recall 1o wi i i it t Ns Pδ α−= + ). 
We first define the notation 3
ˆ2
i i
i
d w
α μγ α μ μ
⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 for  i=d,w. 
Proposition 3 If firm 2 can be considered to be intrinsically better than firm 1 (B>0): 
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a) the profit and market share advantage of firm 2 increase when the capacity of the 
transport link to facility 2, 2s , is extended. The reverse is true for a capacity expansion, 
1s  , at facility 1. 
b) pΔ decreases with 1s  and increases with 2s  if 0dγ > . 
c) wΔ  decreases with 1s  and increases with 2s  if 0wγ < . 
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
When the facility rank is positive, there is an intrinsic advantage to shop at facility 2. If 
capacity on the transport link to facility 2 is increased, extra customers are attracted as 
they are now less discouraged by the higher congestion this creates and travel times in 
fact decrease. This means a higher difference in utility but also a higher difference in 
profits since market share increases. On the other hand, if transport capacity to facility 1 
is extended, firm 2 has to compete for customers who are attracted to the less congested 
facility. 
With regard to differences in prices, the inequality condition 0dγ > implies that price 
difference increases with capacity expansion to facility 2 (respectively decreases with 
capacity expansion to facility 1) when the trip frequency for shopping ( iα ) relative to 
total trip frequency (αˆ ) is more important than consumer shopping diversity 
preferences relative to their overall preferences for diversity. Similarly the inequality for 
wage differences compares the relative importance of commuting trip frequency and 
workplace preferences. If travel time issues are sufficiently important, an increase in 
road capacity to facility 2 allows firm 2 to raise its product price and lower its wage, 
thereby increasing profits. The market share of firm 2 will also be larger. Note that this 
analysis is only concerned with the relative performance of the two firms. It is clear 
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from the Nash equilibrium in prices and wages (8) that the mark-up for both firms is 
greater with congestion than without. 
Obviously only a numerical model allows us to fully appreciate the relative importance 
of the different factors, which have been examined here. In the next section we apply 
the model to a real world case. 
5. APPLICATION TO AIRPORT COMPETITION  
We apply the basic duopoly model to the case of airports offering a package flight and 
parking options as their differentiated product. Hence, in this context, consumers “shop” 
for travel and purchase flights which are produced at the airports. Increasingly cities in 
Europe are served by two (or more) airports, which offer differentiated products in 
terms of quality and frequency of flights but also differ in their facilities and 
accessibility. Examples include London, which is served by Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Stansted, Luton and the City airport, Rome (Ciampino and Fiumincino) and Stockholm 
(Arlanda and Bromma). In this paper we wish to focus on the situation where one 
airport is located close to the city, offering high quality amenities and frequent flights, 
while the second is more remote and offers a ‘no-frills’ service. In terms of our earlier 
duopoly notation, hΔ , βΔ  and tΔ  are non-zero. Brussels, Hamburg and Venice can be 
considered to fall into this category. In particular we concentrate on the case of Brussels 
International Airport (Zaventem) and Charleroi-Brussels South Airport (Charleroi), 
which are located 13 km and 46 km from the centre of Brussels respectively. The model 
structure is shown in Figure 2. We then consider the effect of a number of policy 
options on prices and wages, market share and degree of transport congestion. Clearly a 
number of simplifying assumptions need to be made in order to fit the model to this 
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application. However, given this limitation, it is still possible to generate some 
interesting results from the different policy scenarios.  
. Figure 2  Duopoly structure – airport example 
Zaventem airport offers frequent flights to a large number of destinations by a range of 
airlines. It has good amenities including, for example, many shops, cafes and bars. With 
annual passenger numbers of 15.5 million and car parking for 9000 vehicles, there is 
some road congestion and queuing for parking. Charleroi, on the other hand is a base for 
a small number of low cost airlines, flying infrequently to a limited number of 
destinations. It has limited amenities: only one shop and café. However, with two 
million passengers per year and parking for over 2000, its road infrastructure is much 
less congested. We assume in both cases that the bottleneck for road access occurs at the 
airport entrance. Both airports have public transport connections but we neglect these 
for the purposes of our comparison.7 
In this simple application both airports offer flights (with parking) to the same single 
destination as their differentiated product (hereafter passenger-flight). There are many 
differentiated destinations offered by the two airports. For the sake of simplicity, we 
took one common destination, Dublin, to be representative of prices to all destinations. 
There is no competition between carriers at each airport as, in each case, only one 
airline offers flights to this destination. Further, our city has a population of 8 million, 
which is considered to be the approximate number of potential airport customers in 
Belgium. This city is then assumed to be the only source of passengers and workers at 
the airports. Clearly this implies that everyone is travelling to the airports along the 
same route. Although this is not realistic, we can interpret congestion in the model as a 
                                                     
7 In fact Charleroi has bus connections from each flight to the centre of Brussels and there are at least 3 
trains per hour between Zaventem and central Brussels for most of the day. 
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bottleneck at the airport entrance, which is where we can expect to experience 
congestion on the actual road network. This also allows us to neglect non-duopoly 
traffic. 
Model Calibration 
We first need to calibrate our model using empirical data for the existing market 
equilibrium. For ease of exposition, the model described in Section 3 has a number of 
normalising assumptions, which need to be taken into account when using real data. The 
parameters derived below are presented in terms of the airport economy and have to be 
scaled appropriately to fit the model.  
Weekly passenger numbers are used to determine the proportion of consumers using 
each airport in equilibrium and the trip frequency ( dα ). We assume that one round-trip 
is made per passenger flight. Data on passenger numbers from the airports tell us that 
there are 17.5 million journeys per year with 89% of passengers using Zaventem and 
11% Charleroi. The frequency of commuting trips ( wα ) has been approximated using 
employment figures for the airports. We assume there are approximately 15,000 
employees who work full time at the airports and commute from the city. It is clear 
from these data that not all inhabitants fly or work at the airports. Suitable scaling 
factors are therefore generated to take account in the model of the possible 
combinations of flying or not flying and working or not working at the two airports for 
city residents.  
The uncongested travel times from the centre of Brussels to Zaventem and Charleroi are 
16 and 39 minutes respectively. Congestion is assumed to increase travel time to 
Zaventem by 50% and has no effect on journeys to Charleroi. The bottleneck model is 
then used to calculate road capacity. Passengers may be considered to have a relatively 
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high value of time (VOT) as there is a high penalty for being late for a flight. Here a 
value of €20 is adopted8. 
Prices per passenger-flight are calculated from the lowest available advance internet 
weekend fare to Dublin with roughly the same departure and arrival times. The cost of 
one day long term parking is then added to this. Airport costs are determined by 
imposing that the airports break even and charge airlines and parking at cost9. These 
costs are divided into fixed and variable components. Labour costs are calculated by 
assuming an average annual gross salary of approximately €70,000 and work out to be 
roughly 35% of total costs. We then expect that in the calculated reference equilibrium, 
the average wage at Zaventem is likely to be higher given its size, location and quality.  
Table A2-1 and Table A2-2 in Appendix 2 contain a summary of the fixed and variable 
data for the airport example. These data are scaled before being used in the model.  
Assigning a monetary value to utility of consumption ( h ) and disutility of labour ( β ) is 
not straightforward. Since, passenger-flight prices and congestion costs are higher for 
consumers using Zaventem in preference to Charleroi, we assume that this difference in 
cost is compensated for by the intrinsic quality difference Δh . In addition h  contains a 
premium for the perceived quality of the product at Zaventem (e.g. frequency of 
service). For β , we use the difference in wage plus travel costs between the two 
airports, which indicates that residents have slightly less inclination to work at 
Charleroi. Finally, we neglect the cost of road infrastructure and any government levies 
or head taxes. These have no impact on the market equilibrium but affect welfare. 
Since we have price, wage and market share information, which are the model outputs, 
as well as the input data (costs, utilities and transport parameters), we can calibrate the 
                                                     
8 This is in line with business VOT from UNITE (Nellthorp et al 2001).  
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model to obtain wμ and dμ 10. In this case 2.8wμ = and 4.6dμ = so that the city 
inhabitants have a stronger preference for the airport they fly from than their work 
location11. The model input parameters and data for the existing market equilibrium can 
be found in Appendix 2. 
Results for policy scenarios 
The model results for the reference case are shown in Table 2 below. In addition we 
look at the effect of three policy scenarios: a 50% transport infrastructure capacity 
extension to Zaventem, a differentiated toll and finally a 10% government subsidy per 
passenger for Charleroi. 
The results for the reference case indicate that airlines at Zaventem can charge a high 
price for flights relative to Charleroi because of the high quality (utility of consumption, 
h) of this airport. It is only consumers’ relatively strong preference for departure 
location, dμ , which prevents Zaventem from capturing an even larger market share. 
Clearly its profits are considerably higher than Charleroi. 
The first policy scenario we consider is a 50% increase in road capacity to Zaventem. 
This could also be interpreted as better airport access to parking. 
Recall that only price minus wage can be calculated for each airport. Hence, the wage 
for Charleroi remains unchanged because this is held fixed in the numerical model. The 
changes in prices, wages and market share after the capacity expansion are quite small. 
                                                                                                                                                           
9 See, for example, Pels and Verhoef 2004, Zhang and Zhang 1997 for a discussion of airport pricing. 
10 This is done by substituting the data from Table A1-1 and Table A1-2 into equations (3), (4) and (8). 
Although d wμ μ+  can be calculated quite easily, the value for each parameter is obtained by trial and 
error to get a best fit to the data. 
11 These correspond to scaled values of 0.2d wμ μ= = . The values strongly depend on the other model 
parameters: we can reverse the strength of preferences for working or shopping by adjusting the input 
parameters appropriately.  
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The main reason for this is that in the model we have fixed demand, which is a small 
proportion of the total population (only approximately 5% of residents use the airport 
each week). So, additional capacity does not attract new customers but only existing 
customers away from Charleroi. The parameter dμ is also a factor. Thus the reduction in 
travel costs of roughly €2 per trip makes Zaventem more attractive to potential 
passengers. The airport can slightly increase its price and reduce the wage it offers 
because both customers and employees have smaller travel costs but the changes are 
small as reducing prices attracts more customers, increasing congestion. Note that, in 
line with our results from Section 4, the price difference and difference in profits 
between Zaventem and Charleroi increase as road capacity increases and the wage 
difference decreases. The increase in the difference in profits is equivalent to a total 
gain of €32 million per year. 
Welfare increases compared with the reference case because consumers experience 
reduced travel costs and Zaventem makes greater profits, which are returned to the 
consumer in our economy. The welfare gain of €38.8 million. is, however, a gross gain 
and does not take account of the cost of building this additional infrastructure. The 
capital cost of extending a 10km section of motorway, which has three lanes in each 
direction, by 50% can be estimated at €30 million (Quinet and Vickerman, p132, 2004). 
Maintenance costs over the lifetime can be expected to double this cost. In a congestion 
only analysis (i.e. two symmetric “Zaventem-type” firms), a 50% increase in capacity to 
one congested facility would increase welfare by €11.3 million/year, less than one third 
of the gain when the intrinsic properties of the facility are important. The main reason is 
that it makes more sense to extend the capacity to the airport that is more intensively 
used.  
Table 2  Results for policy scenarios 
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The second policy option is to impose perfect time-differentiated tolling so that 
some consumers leave home earlier or later and queuing is eliminated. 
Again, changes in the price-wage equilibrium are very small compared with the 
reference case; as explained earlier this is due to the particular set-up of the two airport 
economy. Travel costs are also relatively small compared with other costs in the model. 
These depend on the value of time, which could probably be higher for passengers on 
their way to the airport. The route to Charleroi is not tolled as there is no congestion. 
The average toll for Zaventem reflects the queuing costs and the total toll revenue is a 
social benefit, increasing welfare. The elimination of queuing attracts more customers to 
Zaventem but the airport is forced to lower its price and increase its wage to maintain its 
market share because of the tolls, which are in total €3.20 per trip. The difference in 
profits between the two airports actually increases, while the profits themselves 
decrease. These changes also represent a benefit to the consumer and welfare is larger 
both than in the reference case and when road capacity is increased. The cost of 
implementing the tolling scheme has not, however, been included in the calculation. To 
further put this result in context, the welfare gain of €53 million/year can be compared 
to a congestion only analysis with two symmetric links, where both facilities have the 
Zaventem set-up. In this case, differentiated tolling (on both routes) would increase 
welfare by €32 million/year ( 2 2N snα δ? ). 
One possible policy that would be attractive to politicians is to subsidise the smaller 
airport directly so that its marginal costs are reduced. We examine the effect of a 10% 
subsidy. 
The marginal cost subsidy allows Charleroi to reduce its price quite significantly and 
increase its market share. Again, the size of the swing is governed by dμ . Zaventem is 
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forced to reduce its prices to compete and suffers a reduction in profits. The subsidy 
increases the difference in marginal costs and, as shown in Section 4, Table 1, this in 
fact leads to an increase in the difference in price between the two airports but a 
reduction in difference in wages, profits and market share. While congestion is reduced, 
the main benefit of this policy option is to increase the utility of residents who patronise 
Charleroi. The cost of implementing the policy has been taken into account in the 
welfare calculation, resulting in a welfare loss compared to the reference case. The cost 
of the subsidy, assuming the marginal cost of public funds is equal to one is 
approximately €400,000 per year. This could be considered by some as a worthwhile 
investment to maintain employment at Charleroi.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a general equilibrium asymmetric model of imperfect 
competition with congestion. We have examined the duopoly model in detail and 
analysed the effects of firm quality, marginal costs and travel time differences on the 
difference in profits, prices and market share between the two firms. This model is one 
of the first to offer an integrated model of monopolistic competition between facilities 
where both shopping and commuting costs are integrated and that can be 
operationalised for the non symmetrical case. The model works for any facility where 
users have to cover a certain distance from a common origin. In its application one can 
focus on differentiated products, differentiated workplaces or a combination of both. In 
this paper we apply the setting to airport choice and our theoretical findings are in line 
with the literature on airport choice, interpreting quality as flight frequency, and are 
illustrated in the numerical application to the competition between two airports. The 
calibration of the model to congested, nearby Zaventem and to the distant Charleroi 
airport data in Belgium has shown that there is a high premium placed on the quality of 
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Zaventem airport and that consumers have quite strong preferences for where they fly 
from. We tested infrastructure policies, road pricing policies and subsidies for the 
distant airport. Changes in profit and welfare are significant, making the policies more 
or less attractive to different groups.  
The model clearly has a number of limitations, which it would be interesting to explore 
in the future. We do not consider heterogeneous users, such as business and leisure 
travellers with different values of time. Further, no account is taken of different access 
modes to the airports or non-airport users.  
The same proposed framework could not only be used to analyse the impact of a new 
airport (beside Orly and Paris Charles de Gaulle, a third airport has been under 
discussion for Paris for more than a decade), but also to study the impact of closing an 
old airport. A similar study could be carried out for the construction of a new terminal 
in an existing airport or the expansion of an existing terminal. In this case, the port 
authority also has to decide which airline company will use which terminal (such a 
discussion has taken place in Minneapolis, for example, where Northwest is a key actor, 
and has some decision making power concerning the usage of the old and the new 
terminal by other competing companies). The quantitative approach used here could 
explain what the consequences of such policies are and back-up the regulator decisions. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Proof that 0dX ≥ (and 0wX ≥ ) for 0B ≥  
We prove the result for the most general case with congestion and differing capacities. 
The implicit price difference equation is given by 
(1) 
2ˆ22sinh
d d
d
d d d w d w
X X N BPα δμ μ μ μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − − Δ +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, 
where 
2
1
2
1
1 exp 1 expd
d d
d dP s
sX X
sμ μ
−
Δ = ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. It is clear that when B=0, 0dX = . 
Differentiating the expression for dPΔ we obtain 
(2) ( )( )
( )2
2
2 1
exp1 1 1 0
1 exp
d dd
d d d d
XP
X s sX
μ
μ μ
⎡ ⎤∂Δ ⎢ ⎥= + >∂ ⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦
 for all 1 2,s s  
Then differentiating (1) and substituting from (2) we find 
(3) 
1
21 2cosh 2 0
d d d d d
d w d d w d
X X PN
B X
μ μ α δμ μ μ μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ ∂Δ= + + >⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ + + ∂⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
? . 
Hence when 0B ≥ , 0dX ≥ . This clearly holds without congestion ( 0dPΔ = ). A 
corresponding proof applies for wX . 
Proof of Proposition 1 
When there is no congestion 0dPΔ = . The profit difference equation can be rewritten  
(4) ( )
d w
d
d
F SB X
N N
π μ μ
μ
Δ + Δ += − −  
Equation (3) also simplifies to 
(5) 
1
1 2cosh 0
d d d
d w d
X X
B
μ
μ μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ = + >⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ + ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
Differentiating (4) and substituting from (5) leads to  
 
1
1 1 1 2cosh 0
d
d
X
N B
π
μ
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂Δ = − + >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 
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The difference in market share is given 
by ( ) ( ) 12 1 exp 1 1 expd d d d d dP P X Xμ μ −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− = − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Differentiating this we obtain 
(6) 
( ) ( )
( )
2 1
2
2exp
0
1 exp
d d d d
d d d d
P P X
X X
μ
μ μ
∂ − = >∂ ⎡ ⎤+⎣ ⎦
 for 0B ≥  
Hence since (5) and (6) are positive 
 
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 0d d d d ddP P P P XB X B
∂ − ∂ − ∂= >∂ ∂ ∂ . 
We further have d d oX p h tα= −Δ + Δ − Δ and w w o w wX w t N Pβ α α αδ≡ Δ −Δ − Δ − Δ .. 
QED. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The strength of consumer preferences also play a role in the characteristics of the Nash 
equilibrium. The implicit price difference equation (1) simplifies to 
(7) 2sinh
d d d
d d d w
X X Bμμ μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
,  
where d d oX p h tα= −Δ + Δ − Δ . Differentiating (7) leads to 
(8) ( )
1
21 2cosh 0
w w w
d w d w
X X Bμ
μ μ μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ = − + <⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ +⎣ ⎦
 
Further, differentiating the profit difference equation (4) and using d d w wX Xμ μ= we 
obtain 
 1
w d w w
d w w d
X X
N
π μ μ
μ μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞∂Δ + ∂= − +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
  
Substituting from (8) and using symmetry, it is clear that 
 1 1 0d wN N
π π
μ μ
∂Δ ∂Δ= <∂ ∂  
And we also find for the difference in market share 
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( ) ( )
( )
1 2
2 1 2 1
2
21 2cosh exp 1 exp 0
d d d d d d d
d w d d dd w
P P P P X B X X
μ μ μ μ μμ μ
− −∂ − ∂ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + + <⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠+⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
QED. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Considering the effect of changes in congestion levels, differentiation of (1) leads to  
(9) 
12
2
1 1
ˆ2 1 exp 0
d d d
d w d
X N X
s Ls
μ α δ
μ μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ = − + <⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
  
and 
(10) 
12
2
2 2
ˆ2 exp 1 exp 0
d d d d
d w d d
X N X X
s Ls
μ α δ
μ μ μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ = + >⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,  
where 
1 2
1 11 2cosh
d
d
XL M
s sμ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
is positive for all dX . Furthermore  
 
2
1 2
1 1 1 exp 1 exp 0
d d d
d d d d
P X X
X s sμ μ μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂Δ = + + >⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
,  
with 
1 2
1 1 1
2
dP
s s
⎡ ⎤Δ = +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 iff 0dX = . Equivalent results also apply for wX . 
Now differentiating the profit difference equation 
( ) ( )2 22 12 2
2 1
ˆ2 ( )sinh ( )
d dd
d w
d
P PXN N F S
s s
π μ μ δ αμ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎢ ⎥Δ = + + − −Δ +⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
 yields 
 
( )
2
1 1 2 1
2exp( / ) 1 12cosh 1 2exp
d dd d
d d
XQ X X M
s s s s
μπ
μ μ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂Δ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟= − + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,  
( )
2
2 2 1 2
2 exp( / ) exp( / )exp 2cosh 2 exp
d dd d d d d
d d d
XQ X X X XM
s s s s
μπ μ
μ μ μ
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂Δ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟= + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
where 
22 2ˆ
1 exp
d
d
N XQ
L
α δ
μ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 is always positive. Clearly πΔ  is a decreasing 
function of 1s  and an increasing function of 2s  for 0
dX > . 
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We can further differentiate d d o d dX p h t N Pα α αδ= −Δ + Δ − Δ − Δ  and use (9) and (10) 
above to show that 
(11) 
1
2
1 1
ˆ21 exp 1 2cosh
d d d d
d d w d d
p N X X
s Ls
α αδ μ α
μ μ μ α μ
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂Δ = − + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
and 
(12) 
1
2
2 2
ˆ2exp 1 exp 1 2cosh
d d d d d
d d d w d d
p N X X X
s Ls
α αδ μ α
μ μ μ μ α μ
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂Δ = + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
Equations (11) and (12) imply that, for 0dX > , if 3 0
ˆ2
d d
d
d w
α μγ α μ μ
⎛ ⎞= − >⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 the price 
difference pΔ  increases with 2s  and decreases with 1s , while the opposite holds if 
0dγ < . The corresponding results for the wage differences imply that if 
3 0
ˆ2
w w
w
d w
α μγ α μ μ
⎛ ⎞= − <⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 wΔ  increases with 2s  and decreases with 1s , while the 
opposite holds if 0wγ > .  QED. 
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APPENDIX 2 
n No of airports 2 
N No of consumers 8,000,000 
dμ  Consumer heterogeneity for airport - passenger 4.6 
wμ  Consumer heterogeneity for airport employee 2.8 
dα  No of trips per passenger flight 1 
wα  No of trips per hour of labour 0.13 
δ Scaled value of time parameter for congestion costs (€/hour) 5 
β0 
Disutility of labour for non-airport 
employment 0 
Table A2-1 Fixed model inputs 
 
Model inputs  Zaventem Charleroi 
h Airport quality (€/passenger flight) 82 0 
β Disutility of labour (€/hour) 0 1.3 
t0 
Return trip 
uncongested travel 
time (hours) 
0.53 1.3 
s Road capacity (vehicle/week) 352,900 - 
c Variable costs (€/passenger flight) 45 25 
F Fixed costs (€/week) 22,385,720 1,541,440 
Market data  Zaventem Charleroi 
price (p) (€/passenger flight) 180.5 96.3 
wage (w) (€/hour) 37.2 37.2 
market share % city inhabitants 89 11 
Table A2-2 Variable model inputs and existing market equilibrium 
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Figure 1 Schematic of city layout 
 
 
 B=0  
(same rank) 
B>0  
(2 intrinsically 
better than 1) 
∆h 
h2-
h1 
∆β 
β2- β1 
∆c 
c2-c1 
∆to 
t2o-t1o 
μd μw 
∆π= π2- 
π1 
0 ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
∆market 
share = 
2 1P P−  
0 ↑ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
∆p=p2-
p1 
0dh tα= Δ − Δ  0dh tα< Δ − Δ  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ 
∆w=w2-
w1 
0w tβ α= Δ − Δ  0w tβ α> Δ − Δ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ 
Table 1 Comparative statics without congestion 
City = 
residence  
+production of 
other goods 
Production and 
sales of 
differentiated  
good 
Production and  
sales of 
differentiated  
good 
i 
k 
j
Transport flow of 
shoppers, commuters 
and trucks  
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Brussels
Charleroi 
airport
Zaventem
airport
Uncongested road 
Heavily congested road
 
Figure 2   Duopoly structure – airport example 
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Case Airport 
Price Wage 
Market 
share profit (π)
Total 
travel 
cost # 
Δ road 
users Δwelfare 
€/trip € /hour    € / trip €/trip millions/year
millions € / 
year 
Reference 
Zaventem 179.94 39.59 0.859 61.15 15.84   
0 Charleroi 95.75 37.22 0.141 1.50 26   
50% capacity 
extension 
Zaventem 
Zaventem 181.27 39.53 0.866 62.89 14.14 0.13 
38.8 Charleroi 95.67 37.22 0.134 1.41 26   
Differentiated 
toll 
Zaventem 
Zaventem 179.63 39.72 0.865 61.09 13.27 0.10 
53.0 Charleroi 95.69 37.22 0.135 1.43 26   
10% subsidy 
per 
passenger 
Charleroi 
Zaventem 177.66 39.47 0.855 59.04 15.81   
-4.4 Charleroi 93.28 37.22 0.145 1.56 26 0.08 
# Excluding tolls 
Table 2  Results for policy scenarios 
 
